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The rise of Afrlkanerdom as an immanent critique of Marx's
theory of social class
T. Dun bar Hoodie • ; oCT
V '
For-'Marx, social classes are groups which arise in
the course of the division of labour. Based on developments
in the forces of production, class formation leads to inevitable
conflict, as a result of which on* class comes to dominate all
others. Class is thus an identifiable historical actuality;
an objective phenomenon, rooted in the relations of production*
This is vhat Marx calls "class-in-itself"• However precis* its
actuality in the relations of production, however, the reality
of a class-in-itself is obscured by false consciousness. It
must; achieve truo consciousness to become a "class-for-itoelf".
Marx seems to have defined "consciousness" in both a
theoretical and a practical sense. If ve take the German .
Ideology and the Theses on Peuerbach seriously, as I think ve
muat, then it is the practical sense which concerns him most.
True consciousness necessarily implies power. Prior to the,
attainment of power, consciousness is not necessarily false in
the epistemological sense, but it cannot be true in the practical
sense. .
For him, the moment of truth is the moment of powerful
action - the revolution. The failure of a revolution implies
that the revolutionaries were inspired by false consciousness,
at least in the practical sense. Their consciousness, to use
Marx's terms, was not adequately related to the forces of produc-
tion. "No social order ever perishes becfore all the productive
forces for which there is room in it havendevelopedj and new,
higher relations of production never appear before the material
conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old
2 . ' . •'
society itself (Tucker, 1972i5).
Hence the failure of revolution poses no genuine
theoretical problem for Marxism; on* nay simply argue that
the tino vat not yet ripe. Tbo problem ooati vith tbo suocoss
of a revolution vhoit basis is manifestly different from olaaa
eonfliet aa defined by Marx. How dots ono explain cases in
vhich povcr ia achieved by "false oomoiouaneas*1 in the theoretical
sense• The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon is of great
interest precisely becauae it deals vith such a case, Marx's
analysis of the accession of Louis Napoleon salvages the class
theory of history by arguing partly that the time was not ripe,
partly that class factors did play a latent role in the affair*
and partly by suggesting the importance of contingent factor*
(like the army, the bureaucracy, etc.) This final point snist
destroy the entire argument of economic materialIsm unless one
introduces some concept such as Althusser's notion of "over-
dctermination"• In fact, In the Eighteenth Brumaire. Marx
ultimately rescues his argument by introducing the idea ef the
lumpenproletariat - a class-for-itself9 but not in-itaelf.
I wish to suggest that Marx's notion of class, in the
sense of a speoifio relationship between group consciousness and
the forces of production, hoverer fruitful as an ideal typei is
too narrov and thus misleading as the sole basis for an adequate
theory of social change. It is perhaps veil to notice that the
argument that groups act in accordance vith their economic interests
is not Marxian at all. Madison might have said the same, Marx's
class theory Is so cogent beoause it links olaaa to developments
ia the modes ef production, thereby achieving a dynamic which is
particularly seductive beoause it enables us to explain social
change. Nonetheless, I believe that in the case of the rise ef
Afrikanerdom, an explanation in class terms alone is insufficient.
v
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1924 was tht closest South Africa ever cam* to a class
•lection. The Nationalist/Labour Pact came to power en a
platform which promised protection for "civilized labour" against
bqth Rand capitalists and urban African immigrants. Support for
the Pact gorernment came from a combination of white urban skilled
workers and Afrikaans-speaking land-holders and share-croppers who
continued to migrate in great numbers to the .cities where they
were forced to compete on relatively equal terms vith urban
Afrloans.
Once in power, Hertzog's government took immediate steps
to buttress existing discriminatory industrial legislation and to
ensure government jobs at "white wages" for Afrikaner urban
immigrants, Even in 1924, however, a measure of Hertzog's
support came from the Afrikaner rural gentry (wealthy farmers,
country doctors, lawyers, ministers and schoolteachers) and the
Afrikaans-speaking urban elite (mainly schoolteachers, lower-grade
civil servants, the Dutch Reformed clergy and a handful of Cape
Afrikaner businessmen). The Pact appealed to all Afrikaans-
speaking white South Africans, regardless of class, and the English-
speaking aristocracy of labour on the Rand. "Civilised lafeour"
spoke to the economic interests of the urban white proletariat
and all Afrikaans-speakers. Hertzog's speech at Oudefontein on
December 16, 1929, was typical of the "civilised labour" platform.
The European /_he saidj must keep to a standard of living
which shall meet the demands of white civilization.
Civilization and standards of living always go hand in
hand. Thus a white cannot exist on a native wage-scale,
because this means that he has to give up his own standard
of living and take on the standard of living of the native.
In short, the white man becomes a vit kaffer (Die Velkstem,
December 17, 1925).
Hertzog, however, had higher goals than simply to
rescue vhite workers from black competition. Having legislated
for "vhite civilisation", he proceeded to ensure that the principle
of the divisibility of the crown be constitutionally established.
Vith the achievement of the Balfour Declaration in 1926, Hertsog
believed that this had been attained and promptly disavowed any
further agitation for a republic in South Africa. He began to
hint at the need for a united political party made up of all those
white South Africans who placed South Africa first* Only such
a united party could hope to solve the "native problem", and
legislation for that wan next en Hertxeg's agenda.
Hertsog*s abandonment of republicanism and his apparent
willingness to conciliate white English-speakers by playing down
ethnic issues gradually began to lose bin the support of the
different Afrikaner elites in the Transvaal and O.P.S, and in the
Capo.
In the Transvaal* the Broederbond, which had been
founded in 1918 to further the interests of Afrikaans, was
expanded to include the northern elite (academics, junior civil
servants, teachers and clerical workers). Early in the 1920's
its ideological leadership shifted to Potehefstrooa, where
Kuyperian Calvinism, vith its doctrine of sovereinittit in eie
kring. reinforced early Christian Nationalism. Later in the decade,
the successful expulsion of Professor Johan du Plessis from Stellen-
bosch University signified the inroads of Kuyperianism at the Cape.
Dr. Maian was numbered among du Plessis' public defenders.
In fact, at the Cape, Christian Nationalism overlaid an
earlier, more amorphous attachment to the Afrikaans language
which had been the major source of support for the National Party
at tjie Cap* sine* its establishmont In 1913. Indeed, this
langu&g* nationalism had led in the Cap* to the establishment
•f several successful Afrikaner businesses, notably Nasionale
Pers, SANTAM and SANLAM. This provided D.F. Malan, V.A.Hofaeyer
and the Cape National Party vith an economic base independent ef
both Hertseg's personal appeal and Breederbend Christian Nation-
alise. In the 1930's and 1940's, which the Broederbond'a own
economic movement get under vayy there vat frequent rivalry
between Afrikaner companies in the north and the south. This
rivalry continues today (O'Moara, 1975x40-42). ....-.,
Such differences vere ignored in the establishment by
the Broederbond in 1929 of the F.A.K., whose appeal to Afrikaner
separatism was acceptable to both factions. In December, 1933,
J>r. Mai an testified to the success of this "two-stream11 separatism;
•••in place of the original one-stream idea that
Afrikaans and English-speaking children aught net to
be separated in school, we had first the introduction
of parallel classes and thereafter, in the face of
great opposition, parallel schools. Thus also our
universities and colleges, as by an inherent force,
followed suit without state support... Thus also the
original common teachars* associations in all the
provinces split.•• The same thing happened with the
originally common Art and Cultural Associations...,
and with the Child Welfare Associations and the Scout-
Movement, And finally, the same developments took place
in the religious and student-worlds... The two-stream
development of the Afrikaner has largely freed him from
his inferiority feelings; has given him back his self-*'
respect and self-confidence; has awakened in him a new
and living concern in areas where he was previously
dead; and has been unbelievably successful in helping
him ahead in political, social and cultural spheres
(Pie Burger. December 23, 1933).
Ono might indeed question whether this establishment of
separate Afrikaner cultural and social organisations was as
spontaneous as MaIan implied. Nonetheless it was successful.
The movement was authored by Brooderbond members of the Afrikaner
elite. The F.A.K. provided alternative institutional networks
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for Afrikaners in virtually every sphere of cultural life and
imbuqd with nS8/86gS8cy the innumerable voluntary associations
vhich already existed in Afrikaner towns and villages throughout
the land. TRe National Party seemed an outcrop en a vast array
of separatist Afrikaner voluntary associations.
The narrow popular appeal ef such separate institutions
during the 1930*s was demonstrated, however, in the devastating
effects of samesaelting (fusion) in 1933-34, Generals Hertzog
and Smuts formed the United Party in the face of strong opposition
from Dr. MaIan and "cultural" Afrikaners like N.J. van der Merwe.
Virtually the entire National Party of the Transvaal followed aim
into fusion, as did an appreciable number of Pree State Nationalists
Only the Cape Party, under D.F.Malan, V.A. Hofmeyr. and D.7 Erasmus,
remained relatively intact. In the 1938 election, Malan's -
purified National Party had lost 40# of the Afrikaner vote. Por
the forseable future, separatism seemed doomed as a political force,
although the Afrikaner cultural elite remained largely true to
the separatist ideal. ..
Thanks to the efforts of the Broederbond-deminated
Christian National elite, the end of 1938 saw the conversion of
the great mass of ordinary Afrikaners to a consciously nationalist
ideology. The symbols of Afrikaner exclusiveness rose suddenly
to a gigantic crescendo of collective ferment. This new fervour
was dramatically kindled by the celebration of the centenary of
the Voortrekkers* Covenant Oath. Oxvagons, replicas of those
which had trekked in 1838, left Cape Town in August 1938 for
Pretoria where the foundation stone of the Yoortrekkor Monument
was to be laid en December 16. By the time the wagons had reached
their goal, they had traversed the entire country, visiting every
town and hamlet in South Africa. At the outset men were false
Fbeards and occasional women donnod Voortrekker dresoj At the end
the ^ beards were real and Voortrekker garb vas worn by women in
their thousands. Babies were baptized in the shade of the wagons;
couples were"married beside them. Night after night, Afrikaners
•f every class and political description gathered round the wagons
to sing traditional liedjies and partake the braai and coffee of
brotherhood together. Almost every Nationalist politician of
note spoke at one or more ex wag on gathering, but 10 did some O.P.
Afrikaners. Political differences seemed to dissolve in tho heat
of "oxwagon sentiment**. Yolkaoenheid seemed to be at hand*
However, party political bickering continued after the
Celebrations. The Ossevabrandvag, which had been formed to
continue the experience of unity, had little hope of widespread
support at this stage. Declaration of war in 1939, broke tho
United Party and brought Hertsog and Malan together again* Tho
Broederbond executive jubilantly arranges a hasty meeting Ton tho
site of the Voortrekker Monument. Between forty and seventy
thousand attended*
A miracle has occured [announced Die Postering I <
Afrikanerdom is reunited. Ve cannot yet comprehend
the deeper significance of these words. They are too
overwhelming. In the anxious hour of crisis, the
miracle occured. Out of the darkness which has
dominated the past historic week, a united Afrikaner
people has emerged to view; never again will it
allow imperialism to divide it and take from it its
freedom... The new day of Afrikaner unity for which J
we have all so eagerly longed and pleaded has dawned.
The final complete freedom of Afrikanerdom and South
Africa is assured. In the spirit of the centenary
year. Afrikanerdom now proceeds united along the Path
of South Africa (Die Ooaterllg. September 8, 1939).
Of course, the miracle had not h&pp#Qed even then.
Afrikaner unity would fail again and again during the war years.
But if the idea of theoretical consciousness is at all valid for
social groups, Afrikanerdom achieved theorotica^l consciousness
8between August 1938 aad October 1939. Thia Afrikaner consciousness
vaa based not on e l m (not even en race) but en culture, upon
language and tradition. In this sense* fer Marxists, it must
have been fals*. And yet victory for the National Party in 1948
vould have been impossible without it.
Group conaeiouaneaa ia never pure, complete te every
member ef the group, unsullied by political and econonio interests.
Group consciousness Is roeted in the everyday profanities of social
life. In one sense it is transient, ene risks it in attempting
to realize it practically* and yet, if impractical, it is aoom lost
in unrealised dreams. However* once it has come into being, even
theoretically, in the minds of the masses* not just in the minds of
the elite vhe propagate it, it is a source ef inspiration. It
becomes available to members ef the group as a rallying point for
action* touching petty doings with the prospect of heroism. It
becomes a resource ef symbols* te be plundered fer meaning in times
of doubt and despondency. After 1939* the Afrikaner theoretical
consciousness came to life in just this sense.
• . • ... .••-!•.}
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Thus far I have argued that cultural factors vere more
important than race or class in the rise of Afrikanerdom. Not
that race or class vere irrelevant* but rather that these as
exigencies vere mediated through Afrikaner cultural consciousness.
We have aeon that race vas a meat important aspect ef
the Pact platform in 1924. This has been equally true of every
subsequent election in South Africa. But* after 1938, the survival
of "white civilization" in South Africa vas held by Nationalists
necessarily to entail the survival of Afrikanerdom. In a typical
speech in 1942* MaIan said that it vas the Afrikaner people* not
simply members of the white race* whom God had created on the
southern tip of Africa to b« nburtr of Christian culture and
civilization" (Die Tru-nnvalor. Decenber 16, 1942).
v
Afrikanerdon night be chosen of God. Nonetheless,
there was lfttle in the social and economic history of South
Africa since 1880 to give firm evidence for the fruit* of such
election. In 1932, the Carnegie Report calculated that one-third
of the Afrikaans-speaking population were poor whiten, "in no
position to live respectably". For at least fifty years before
1934, the Dutch Reformed Church at the Cape had been expressing
concern about Afrikaner poverty. In November 1916, the Cape
Church organised the first volkskongres on poor vhiteism. fe
Malan, vho had but recently resigned his Dutch Reformed Ministry
to become the first editor of Die Burger addressed the tvo hundred
representatives;
Instances have come to our attention vhere children
of one large family vander in the veld as naked as the
kafirs of the Conge. Ve knov teday of Afrikaans girls
vho are in service to Coolies or Chinese, of white men
and vomen, married or unmarried, vho live together with
coloureds. And they are our flesh and blood and carry
our names. They are Afrikaners all... (du Plessis, E.P.,
1964U4-45).
As a solution to Afrikaner poverty, Malan and most ef
his contemporaries proposed that the poor be resettled on the land.
Already on the Rand, hovever, the founders of the Broederbond bad
accepted the fact that urbanization vas an irrevocable step fer
the Afrikaner. They concentrated on ways and means by which the
urban migrant might b« saved for the volk. The very speed vitb
which Afrikaners moved te the cities meant that ghettoes were
established, within which, despite poverty, the Afrikaans language
and the Dutch Reformed faith could be preserved entire. But in a
\ new environment no cultural system remains quite the same, Afrik-
> aner beliefs became mere militant and ideological in the city,
which nurtured the new Christian Nationalism.
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Indeed, during the early thirties, Kuyperian Christian
Nationalism had had grafted onto it a rigorous type of nationalise -
v
brought back by young intellectuals who had gone to Europe for
further study,. They led the breakaway ef the A.N.S. fro* N.U.S.A.S.
The leader of this group of young enthusiasts was Nic Diederlchs,
then Professor of Philosophy at U.K.O.V.S. Others included Geoff
Cronje and Piet Meyer. Their most important innovation, besides
their enthusiasm, was their insistence that the Afrikaner norement,
se ' far purely cultural and political in form, must receive economic
* •
expression.'
At least since 1933, Maian and N.J. van der Merve ha4
been expressing concern about the divisive effects of class
consciousness upon Afrikaner volkaoenhoid. One of Maian1a most
important reasons for staying out of fusion vas the feeling that,
if union included Smuts' capitalist supporters, class division
within the new party would be inevitable and would permanently
destroy Afrikanerdom. Immediately after fusion, the purified
National Party constantly appealed to working-class Afrikaners,
furs-posing a vide range of welfare measures.
The new nationalists (I shall call them Nee-Pichteans)
returned from Europe convinced that welfare vas not enough. They
combined a militant fear of communism vith an ins1stance that
the Afrikaner vorker must be saved for nationalism by the organ-
isation of truly Afrikaner labour unions. In 1935, Piet Meyer
returned from doctoral studies in Amsterdam to become assistant
secretary of the P.A.K. In May 1936, he issued two lengthy
statements in the name of the F.A.K. urging cultural unity as the
solution to the two major threats which faced Afrikanerdoas the
conciliatory party politics of the United Party and the divisive
effects of communist-inspired class conflict. In October 1936,
nMeyer and Albert Hertzog, vith other*, founded the Nationale Uaad
•an Trustees to finance Christian National Afrikaner trade unions.
In November, they founded the Afrikaner Bond van Mynverkers. The
extant Mineworkers1 Union was dominated by English-speakers and
corrupt despite its largely Afrikaans-speaking membership.
The leaders quickly wrapped up a closed shop vith the Chamber *f
Mines, thereby effectively destroying the Mynverkers Unie, There
was an organised outcry from the Afrikaans platteland but to no
••ail* Unabashed, Albsrt Hertzog began to organize a reform
movement to take ever the Minevorkers* Union from vithin.
Financial aid from tome wealthy Cape Nationalists sav them finally
achieve their aim in 1948, although corrupt!en continued unabated
under the new Afrikaner leadership. Efforts to take over other
unions proved unsuccessful until after the "revolution of 1948"•
Nonetheless, the biggest electoral awing in the 1948 election was
•n the Rand where the National Party captured 6 new seats.
The upsweep of enthusiasm for Afrikaner volksoenhoifl ia
1938, enabled Noo*Pichtoan Broederbondere to emphasize the economic
issue in direct relationship to the Afrikaner theoretical
consciousness. In February 1933, some months before the Osaevatrek,
the venerable ds. Kestell made a plea for a great Beddingsdaad on
behalf of poor white Afrikaners* He suggested that funds be
collected to buy farms on which poor whites could be settled. His
appeal WAS thus in the "back to the country mould". By the time
the wagons reached Bloemfontein in October 1938, Kestell's suggestion
had been taken up with enthusiasm by the Nee-Fichteans, who turned
it into a plea for a Reddingsdaad en behalf of urban Afrikaner*.
In his speech on this occasion in Bloemfontein, Cronje expressed
this new theme clearlyt
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The Boer culture must be carried into the English
cosmopolitan life of the city... It is an appalling
^struggle and more than one Boer has already been
demolished in this difficult transition period in our
ethnic life. But our hope is that the organised
Afrikaner action in the city will day by day become
more purposeful and irrosistable... Ye. must not allow
the urbanisation of the Afrikaner to divide our People.
Ve must not allow the city Afrikaner to become a different
kind ef Afrikaner from hie fellow on the farn (Foes by die
Vaens. 1939(40)
By 1939, over 7,000 pounds had been collected la the
Roddingsdaadfoods (d» Plessis, E.P.f 1964il35). A volk«kongros
vas called to decide how to administer it. At this congress,
Professor L.J. du Plessis of Potchefstroom, an eminent Broer,
outlined a scheme for volkakapi tali sine. The roots of Afrikaner
poverty, he suggested, lay not in capitalism as such, but ia the
fact that Afrikaners had been systematically excluded from the
fruits of capitalism. Vhat vas needed was not the abolition of
capitalism but that it be captured for the volk.
As organised Afrikanerdom [_said du Plessis at the
volkakongresH we wish consciously to take part in the
economic development of our land, naturally in order
to ensure our own existence, but above all to restore
our People to Prosperity And so enable it to fulfill
its God-given calling... £ln the paa-Q ve accepted as
inevitable that the masses who vere unable to adjust
£\o capitalism) quickly or well enough should drop to
poor whiteism. Sympathetically we belittled them and
separated ourselves from them, or at best offered them
"alms" in a philanthropic manner... Meantime this
process of adjustment vas destroying our People by
denationalization of its producing masses. But in the
awakening of self-consciousness the People has become
aware of this also, and the new ethnic movement is ^
intended to prevent the further destruction of the
Afrikaner People in an effort to adjtst to a foreign
capitalist system, and intends rather to nobilize the
People to conquer this system and to transform it so
that it fits our ethnio nature (du Plessis, E.P., 1964U04)
Fifty percent of the Reddingsdaadfonds vas thus invested
in the establishment of an Afrikaner investment house, which vas
to become Federate Volksbeleggings• In addition, a grant vas made
to Albert Hertseg'e Raad van Trustees. The remainder vas
administered by the newly founded Economic Institute ef the P.A.K.
to finane* Afrikaner small businesses. A movement called the
Reddingsdaadbond was founded under Diederichs' leadership to teach
the values of an industrial economy - to make profits, to produce
beyond personal need, to borrov and lend at interest, to save and
to buy - all vith an eye to the Afrikaner interest. In the final
analysis, this movement vas perhaps as important as Albert Hertzog'
labour organisation in winning urban seats for the National Party*
III - :-4
In 1948, the Afrikaner theoretical consciousness
achieved its practical moment. It is ironical that so important
an event C<MB« SO unexpectedly and dependent on so many contingent
factors (Stulti, 19741147-157). This ought hardly to come a*
a surprise to readers of Althusser, hovever. He says: •:-
The whole Marxist revolutionary experience shovs that,
if the general contradiction...is sufficient to define
the situation vhen revolution is the "task of the day",
it cannot of its own simple, direct pover induce a
"revolutionary situation", nor a fortiori a situation of
reveultionary rupture and the triumph of the revolution,
if this contradiction is to become "active" in the
strongest sense, to become a ruptural principle, there
must be an accumulation of "circumstances" and "currents"
so that whatever their origin and sense (and many of them
vill necessarily be paradoxically foreign to the revolution
in origin and sense, or even its "direct opponents"),
they "fuss" into a ruptural unity... (1970:99)
In the case ve are considering, however, the general
contradiction can hardly be said to have been between forces of
production and relations ef production embodied in class antagonist
Antagonism there certainly was, and often it was an expression of
economic interests. The political victory of 1948, indeed, enable
Afrikaners to appropriate a greater share of South Africa's tcoaomi
wealth* But it seems to me confusing to tllide class interests
and ethnic interests. Class categories cut across ethnic boundari
in the case we are considering - and revolutionary consciousness
is ethnio not class consciousness.
Surely in any one society there are innumerable potential
bases for militant consciousness. Racef language, religion and
sex come at once to Bind, along with class. Achievement of
consciousness (theoretical and practical) on the basis of any of
these alternative sources oust involve a complex ef actual patterns
of repression, experiences of oppression, formulation of ideologies,
leaders and parties and the passage of time. Group consciousness
is surely never inevitable, alvays fragile,and subject to
innumerable counter-pressures. One of the dangers of reifying
one single, base fer true consciousness is that one is tempted to
deny the strength of alternative bases* I believe that Marx's
logic of the role of consciousness in revolution makes eminently
good sense. The theory of the economic base, even in the last
instance, teems more difficult to sustain, much as it would help
in the explanation of events.
Postscript f ,
My reading of Marx implies that for him consciousness
is an essential aspect of revolutions. It vould be profoundly
unfair, however, to suggest that revolution is no more than a
change of consciousness (theoretical aspect) or a simple leisure
of power (practical aspect). Revolutions must also be considered
in terms of their effects. Do Tocqueville, for instance, implies
that the Preach Revolution was no more than a coup d'etat, since
the structure of French society remained the same, or changes that
did take place would have done so anyway. Equally, Marx might
have argued that the 1948 election in South Africa was no revolution
at all. No-one surely would deny that it vas an electoral ooup
d'etat, Vhat have been the long-term effects of Afrikaner power
upon South African social structure and, in particular, upon the
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economy., . , , , . . , -
v In criticizing Marx'a theory on the lev*! of class
formation and class consciousness, this essay has overlooked the
great importance of economic development in South African history*
The half-century between 1925 and 1975 has seen radical change in
the structure of South African society. In 1925, So4th Africa
had a typically colonial economy, exporting raw materials (essentia
gold) and importing manufactured goods. By 1975, scholars seen
agreed that South Africa is one of the very few "underdeveloped"
countries to have leapt the chasm from a "backward" te an "advanced
economy. South Africa is no longer an economic or political
satellite of the metropolitan Vest. In fact, recent attempt* at
detente may be interpreted as efforts to establish for South Africa
a metropolitan relationship with satellite countries to the north.
^arrington Moore has argued that "at bottom all forms
of industrialization so far have been revolutions from above, the
work of a ruthless minority" (1966:506). Certainly in South
Africa, primitive accumulation has implied racial oppression.
Indeedf to carry Barrington Moore's argument one stop further,
one might argue that a generally high degree of state control in
both polity and economy has been a necessary cost of advance in
satellite states. Eric Uobstoawm (1968:135-138) points out that
until 1873, British dominance made Free Trade a viable ideological
option, although even then budding "advanced" countries like
Germany and the U.S. followed a protectionist economic policy.
In fact, if independent economic development, is protectionism
not a sine qua non. Certainly in Afrikaner-dominated South
Africa (and here one must include Hertsog's pre-fusion regime)
there hac been a large measure of state control in the economy
and, of course, in society at large also.
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The Afrikaner state in South Africa has been absolutist
• *• over against blacks and protectionist over against foreign
,
r
 competition. The United Party waa noticeably more agreable to
' '*
:
'' "' economic dependence upon Britain and, in its later years (e.g.
'* ' the Fagan Commission) more conciliatory to blacks. Frequently
" it is argued that Nationalist rule has slowed economic'development
:,frfi>o-^ > in South Africa. ' Am I wrong to wonder if it might have speeded
t h i n g s u p ? - * •• . . . . . . .
\ There are other reasons for South Africa's great leap
forward. One night mention the enonmous mineral resources of -
the country, the existence of a white entrepreneurial class
already imbued with ihe capitalist spirit, capital investment from
outsidet the chronological and financial relationship between
diamond and gold mining, early dominion status within the British
Empire, and so on. Nevertheless, it is surely difficult to ignort
the large measure of state control in the South African economy
as an important factor. And the Afrikaner revolution has certain!
faremrod protectionism in South Africa.
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